Obama and the World: Introduction

The election is finally over and now it's time to think about how the U.S. is going to interact with the world under an Obama administration. Considering that I am an International Relations scholar first and foremost (and hackish political pundit only in my spare time) I am going to spend the next few posts analyzing how I think Obama's administration is going to deal with the various foreign policy challenges that are coming down the pike in the next few years, with an emphasis on diplomatic issues. Diplomacy is a pretty nebulous concept, so I will be hoping to unpack it to help make sense of what is going on in various regions.

At the most basic level, it seems people in general have high hopes for Obama. The world clearly wanted him to win in a big way prior to the election. Take a look at this very pretty interactive Gallup poll that Foreign Policy Magazine had on their website in the run-up to the elections; I'll be referring to it in subsequent posts. The numbers are pretty striking. If the world had a candidate it supported, it was generally Obama, and then overwhelmingly so. McCain only had more support in Georgia, the Philippines, and Cambodia (Laos is within what I imagine was the polls margin of error - usually +/-3%).

But look carefully at the map. Certainly, the West was heavily invested in this election and very pro-Obama. Middle-Eastern countries and China - i.e. the tricky areas - tended to not have an opinion on who should win, or if they did, said they didn't think it would make a difference. This is a bit of cold water in the face of people who think the whole world is as happy with Obama's win as the people who are reading this blog might be(all three of them).

This evidence is further supported by the interactive map at Pew, which is even more fun. While McCain was truly despised the world over, there is not a huge amount of support for Obama in geo-strategically significant areas outside of the West.

The Obama administration is not going to get it easy at the start in other words. In fact, there is a chance that they may be tested early on. But, based on the policy direction that Obama outlined during his campaign, as well as his response to issues such as the Georgia-Russia war(?) in August, I think he is going to help the U.S. adjust to a changing world, bring allies closer together, and calmly but firmly put challengers back in their boxes.

So consider this the prologue to a number of discussions/predictions on what an Obama administration might do in the world. I will have separate posts on the Middle-East & Iraq, China, U.S. allies/Europe/NATO, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror (though I just found out yesterday that it is no longer called that), and maybe even Climate Change (I haven't decided yet).

But to start with in the next post, I will go with everyone's favorite new Hollywood-esque threat: Putin's..er Medvedev's Russia.

International Relations 101 #2

As an example of the effective integration of theory and substantive questions, I would like to submit the example  of Ruth Lane from American University, who wrote an article (gated) in the latest (Oct 08) PS: Political Science and Politics.  She  writes about teaching a class in comparative politics, rather than IR, so her substantive conclusions and reading list are not relevant.  But, the general approach seems to hit the target that I outlined in my previous post.  Her major point is that introducing game theory as an organizing principle enables a theoretically sophisticated way to analyze international phenomena.  At this point I can hear the mental red flags going up in anyone within political science.  The point here is not that science isn't science without multivariable calculus being involved.  Rather, Lane's use of game theoretic concepts helps students focus on the ``players, goals, strategies, and outcomes'' as well as the interdependence or independence of action.  This, she claims, has beneficial effects.  When students find out about a policy they often simply say that it has been put into effect.  In Lane's class

``they are then challenged to redefine such opaque reports with game theory's sharp questions: who exactly were the players (who proposed the policy, who opposed it), what were their goals (stated and unstated), why did the interaction result in this particular outcome (how did the players see the payoffs and choose their strategies?)?  This makes an important pedagogical point, that events do not just happen but are part of an ongoing battle between social forces of various types.  Game theory provides essential tools to undertake what might otherwise be an unguided journey.''

But game theory is the complete antithesis of a focus on substantive phenomena!  Lane complements the use of game theoretic concepts with what she calls idiographic studies that are `interesting' and `make learning a pleasure'.  I wonder what kind of idiographic studies we have in IR.  Maybe this would include a history book on the Cuban Missile Crisis or some  contemporary foreign policy, like Dennis Ross's Statecraft.  I think that this concept could be taken further though.  Lane uses some books that are chosen more for their accessibility and wow factor than their scholarly rigor.  She even assigns a travel book for the material on China.  I can see the immediate criticism here (to echo someone I was speaking to recently about teaching), i.e., ``It's not supposed to be fun, it's supposed to be informative!''  The response here is that choosing readable material, rather than a textbook (for god's sake, this isn't chemistry), is aimed at effective pedagogy, not infotainment.  If a non-theoretical book is assigned, with the aim of providing accessible information on a substantive empirical topic, and then the events are analyzed using either game-theoretic concepts or constructivist theories, then I don't see how this can be dismissed as `fun'.  I do think that there might be a problem with finding accessible accounts of international phenomena, or maybe it is just that those are not the books that I am reading at the moment.  

Next, I'll cannibalize another article for concrete ways to teach game theory to IR undergrads.

International Relations 101 #1

I've been thinking for a long time about what a good ``Intro to IR'' class might look like.  I have experienced several, both at the undergraduate and graduate level, but I feel like there is something systematically wrong with the way that IR theory is presented to students.  It is possible that this problem is due to the way that IR scholars think about IR theory, but I will bracket this issue (perhaps for later discussion).  The immediate motivation for my current post was this post over at Worlds Apart about what he calls the `Baylis and Smith' approach to IR theory after an undergraduate textbook edited by these two scholars.

This approach treats the field of international relations as an ongoing debate between proponents of between three and a half dozen theoretical approaches (depending on how eclectic the course/tutor/academic institution is) ... [B]y pigeon-holing approaches into one of a few theoretical positions, it has intellectually and pedagogically unhealthy consequences.

What he seems to mean by this is the idea that IR theory is best understood by starting with the idea that there are a number of competing `paradigms' or theoretical traditions and then learning ``what they are'', i.e. what Realism is, what Neo-Liberal Institutionalism is, etc. etc.  Some challenges to this approach might take the position that what is really important is to add to this list of paradigms, in that it is important to include constructivism, feminism, critical theory (Marxism?) et al.  I claim that this is misguided.  The problem with teaching IR theory in the `B&S' way is not that it limits the exposure of students to theoretical viewpoints.  The problem is, or the problems are, that these paradigms are not internally coherent and so do not provide us with guidance about analyzing substantive topics of international politics, AND that the focus is then on the theories as theories, rather than on theories as ways of understanding substantive questions/phenomena.  If we put the practical application of IR theory at the forefront of the pedagogical enterprise, this should have several effects:

1) students will understand why IR theory is important 

2) students will be aware that theory is imperfect, in the sense that assumptions and simplification are inevitable and even desirable sometimes

3) students will be able to explain phenomena theoretically when they successfully complete the course, rather than only be able to delineate where Realism stops and critical theory starts (a largely fruitless enterprise and not one that is or should be at the center of a scientific discipline - solving conceptual problems is important, but not one that undergraduates should necessarily be doing on day one) or recite potted, atheoretical accounts of terrorism, humanitarian intervention or whatever.  

By `practical application' I don't mean policy oriented.  There is a place for policy prescription and it is professional MA programs, not undergraduate or doctoral programs in political science departments.  By practical application I mean the ability to take some international situation and explain it in a way that would not be possible without having learned the theories in the class; hopefully in a more sophisticated way.  This sounds all fine and dandy, but how can we go about addressing substantive questions while still maintaining theoretical emphasis?  One example will be in my next post.